Abstract. In [12] a Zero-Knowledge scheme ZK(2) was designed from a solution of a set of multivariate quadratic equations over a finite field. In this paper we will give two methods to generalize this construction for polynomials of any degree d, i.e. we will design two Zero-Knowledge schemes ZK(d) andZK(d) from a set of polynomial equations of degree d. We will show thatZK(d) is optimal in term of the number of computations to be performed and that ZK(d) is optimal in term of the number of bits to be send. Moreover this property is still true for all kinds of polynomials: for example if the polynomials are sparse or dense. Finally, we will present two examples of applications: with Brent equations, or with morphisms of polynomials.
Introduction
The first Zero-Knowledge schemes were based on the factorization problem (for example Fischer-Micali-Rackoff in 1984, or Fiat-Shamir in 1986) or the Graph Isomorphism Problem. However the factorization problem is not expected to be a NP complete problem (since it is in NP and Co NP) and it has sub-exponential algorithms (such as NFS) and even polynomial algorithms on quantum computers (Shor algorithm). Then, it was proved in 1991 by O. Goldreich, S. Micali and A. Widgerson that any problem of NP has a Zero-Knowledge proof ( [4] ). But the general construction (cf [4] ) of Zero-Knowledge proofs from any problem of NP is usually not very efficient. This is why various Zero-Knowledge schemes have been specifically designed from some well suited and well chosen NP complete schemes based on simple combinatorial problems expected to be exponentially difficult, such as PKP of Adi Shamir [13] , PP of David Pointcheval [11] or CLE [15] or SD [14] of Jacques Stern for example. Recently ( [12] ) such a scheme was designed from the MQ problem, i.e. the problem of finding a solution from a set of multivariate quadratic equations over a finite field. This MQ problem is related to various primitives in cryptography [2, [7] [8] [9] , and is NP-complete over any finite field ( [3, 10] ).
In this paper, we will generalize the construction of [12] in order to design a Zero-Knowledge authentication from a solution of any set of multivariate polynomials of degree d over a finite field (i.e. not only d = 2). We will describe two schemes extending the results of [12] . The Zk(d) scheme is optimal if we focus on the number of bits to be sent and theZK(d) scheme is optimal if we consider the number of computations. This is true for any kind of polynomials (dense or sparse). For practical applications the case d = 3 (i.e. cubic equations) is particularly important, since from these polynomials we will be able to design Zero-Knowledge schemes based on the (NP-complete) Morphism problem (MP) or from the Brent equations related to the optimal way to solve sets of linear equations (i.e. improvements of the Gauss elimination). We will explain in this paper why these two problems are really interesting for cryptography. We can notice that MP (morphism of Polynomial) is NP hard while IP (isomorphism of Polynomials) is expected not to be NP hard (since it has an Arthur-Merlin game for yes or no answers). We will detail the case d = 3 and give only the features of the general schemes ZK(d) andZK(d).
Zero-Knowledge Protocols and Commitments
In an interactive Protocol, there are two entities: the prover and the verifier. The Prover wants to convince the verifier that she knows a secret. Both interact and at the end, the verifier accepts or refuses. In Zero-Knowledge Protocols there is a possibility of fraud. A cheater will be able to answer some of the questions (but not all of them). The protocol must be designed such that an answer to one of the question does not give any indication on the secret but if someone is able to answer all the questions then this will reveal the Prover's secret. We will use the following definitions in order to describe the properties that we want to be satisfied by our protocols:
1. The protocol has perfect correctness is a legitimate prover is always accepted. 2. The protocol is statistically zero knowledge if there exists an efficient simulating algorithm U such that for every feasible Verifier strategy V , the distributions produced by the simulator and the proof protocol are statistically indistinguishable. 3. The protocol is proof of zero knowledge with error knowledge α if there is a knowledge extractor K and a polynomial Q such that if p denotes the probability that K finds a valid witness for x using its access to a prover P * and p x denotes the probability that P * convinces the honest verifier on x, and p x > α, then we have p ≥ Q(p x − α).
In our protocols, we will need string commitment schemes. A string commitment function is denoted by Com. The commitment scheme runs in two phases.
1. The commitment scheme is statistically hiding if for uniform (x, ρ) and (x , ρ ) the distributions Com(s, ρ) and Com(x , ρ ) are statistically indistinguishable. This means that the commitment to x reveals (almost) no information on x even to an infinitely powerful Verifier. 2. The commitment scheme is computationally binding if the probability to that two different values (x, ρ) and (x , ρ ) produce the same c = Com(x, ρ) = Com(x , ρ ) is negligible in polynomial time, i.e. the chances to change the committed value after the first phase are very small.
A practical construction of such a commitment is given in [5] .
Systems of Multivariate equations of degree d
We consider the following function of degree d from F n q to F m q :
where ∀ , 1 ≤ ≤ m, and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ):
We omit the constant term. Let
ZK(3) Schemes
We consider the following cubic functions:
We have:
Then G is trilinear. The problem is: Given F and v ∈ F m q find s ∈ F n q such that F (s) = v. The public key is (F, v). The secret is s such that F (s) = v. The Prover is going to convince the Verifier of his knowledge of s.
3-pass scheme
For simplicity, the random string in Com is not written explicitly. If X is a set, x ∈ R E means that x is randomly chosen in X with the uniform distribution.
1. The Prover picks up r 0 , r 1 , t 0 ∈ R F n q and e 0 , f 0 , h 0 ∈ R F m q . Then she computes
The Prover sends to the Verifier
2. The verifier chooses a query Q ∈ R {0, 1, 2, 3} and sends Q to the prover. 3. (a) If Q = 0 then the Prover sends (r 0 , r 1 , t 1 , e 1 , f 1 ). The Verifier checks if
The verifier outputs 1 if the she gets the correct value in the commitments, 0 otherwise.
Properties of the 3-pass scheme
It is easy to see that the verifier always accepts an interaction with the honest prover. Thus the 3-pass scheme has perfect correctness.
Theorem 1
The 3-pass protocol is statistically zero knowledge when the commitment scheme Com is statistically hiding.
Proof. We construct a black-box simulator S which have oracle access to a cheating verifier CV takes F and v, and outputs a simulated transcripts with probability 3/4 as follows. The simulator randomly chooses a value Q * ∈ R {0, 1, 2, 3} and vectors s , r 0 , r 1 , t 0 ∈ R F n q and e 0 , f 0 , h 0 ∈ R F m q , where Q * is a prediction what value the cheating verifier CV will not choose. Then it computes
Moreover it sets:
It also computes:
and sends (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) to CV. Receiving a query Q from CV the simulator outputs ⊥ if Q = Q * and stops. If S does not output ⊥, it produces a transcript as follows:
We can check that if S does not output ⊥, the transcript is accepted. For example, we consider the case where Q * = 0 and Q = 2. The output is ((c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ), 2, (r 1 , r 2 , t 1 , e 1 , f 1 , h 1 )). Thus, we have the right values for c 2 and c 4 . Now, c 0 is computed as follows:
Thus we obtain c 0 = Com(r 1 , r 2 , G(t 0 , r 1 , r 2 ) − f 0 − h 0 + e 0 ) and the transcript is accepted. The other cases are checked similarly. We now show that the distribution of the output S is statistically close to the distribution of a real transcript since the commitment is statistically hiding. A real transcript between the the legitimate prover P and a cheating verifier CV on (F, v, s) is denoted by P (s), CV (F, v). The simulator output is denoted by S, CV (F, v) . We analyze the output distribution. First first we consider the case where Q = 0. Then
Assume that (r 0 , r 1 , t 0 , e 0 , f 0 ) = (r 0 , r 1 , t 0 , e 0 , f 0 ). Then we obtain t 1 = t 1 , e 1 = e 1 , f 1 = f 1 and c 1 = c 1 , c 2 = c 2 in all cases Q * = 1, 2, 3. The second case is when Q = 1. Then
This case is very similar to the previous one. We get t 1 = t 1 , e 1 = e 1 , h 1 = h 1 and c 3 = c 3 , c 4 = c 4 in all cases Q * = 0, 2, 3. The third case is Q = 2. Then
We can check that for all these cases we obtain:
The last case is Q = 2. Then
Assume that (r 0 , r 1 , t 0 , e 0 , f 0 , h 0 ) = (r 0 s − s, r 1 , t 0 , e 0 , f 0 , h 0 ), then we obtain r 2 = r 2 , c 0 = c 0 , c 1 = c 1 and c 3 = c 3 . Since the commitment is statistically hiding, we get that when S does not output ⊥, the distribution of the output of S is statistically close to the distribution of the real transcript.
Theorem 2 The 3-pass protocol is proof of zero knowledge with zero knowledge error 3/4 when the commitment scheme Com is computationally binding.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a false prover C that can answer all the questions. Then either C will compute a collision for Com or will extract a solution
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If two tuples of the arguments of Com are are distinct on either of the above equations, then we have a collision for Com. Otherwise, these equalities give:
and r
= e (0) 1
So, all upper scripts are useless and from (1) we have:
Then, from (2) and (4) we have r 0 = t 0 +t 1 , F (r 0 ) = e 0 +e 1 , F (r 0 +r 1 ) = f 0 +f 1 and F (r 0 + r 2 ) = h 0 + h 1 , so if we replace these values in the previous equality, we obtain:
This means that a solution r 0 + r 1 + r 2 for v is extracted. Let p s be the probability that P * convinces the honest verifier on s and p the probability that all the 3 transcripts are accepted. Suppose that p s > 
Computations in the 3-pass scheme
We give the maximum number of computations that have to be done either by the prover or by the receiver in the case of F 2 . We must calculate the number of computations for F and for G. Moreover we see that F is computed at most 3 times and G is computed just one time. We only count multiplications. In F 2 , we have:
Let M denotes the number of multiplications needed to compute F . Using the above expression for F , we obtain M n choose n = 84, m = 80, in order to have 80-bit security (cf. [2] ). Moreover if we want an impersonation probability less than 2 −30 , we need to perform at least 73 rounds. R stands for the number of rounds and C for the maximum number of computations that have to be done either by the prover or by the receiver. The values are given in Table 1 . Remark. We may need less computations. It depends on the number of non zero coefficients. This is the case for Brent equations as explain in Section 8.
5-pass scheme
Here we describe briefly a 5-pass scheme. Proofs are sketched in Appendix A.
1. The Prover picks up at random r 0 , r 1 , t 0 ∈ F n q and e 0 , f 0 , h 0 ∈ F m q . Then she computes r 2 = s − r 1 − r 0 . The Prover sends to the Verifier
2. The verifier picks α ∈ R F q and sends α to the prover. 3. The prover computes:
and sends (t 1 , e 1 f 1 , h 1 ) to the verifier. 4. The verifier picks Q ∈ R {0, 1, 2} and sends Q to the prover. Com(r 1 , r 2 , α(v −F (r 1 +r 2 )+F (r 1 )+F (r 2 ))−G(t 1 , r 1 , r 2 )−f 1 −h 1 +e 1 ).
As for the 3-pass scheme, we have perfect correctness and the following results:
Theorem 3 The 5-pass protocol is statistically zero knowledge when the commitment scheme Com is statistically hiding.
Theorem 4
The 5-pass protocol is proof of zero knowledge with zero knowledge error 2/3 + 1/3q when the commitment scheme Com is computationally binding.
5 TheZK(3) Scheme.
In this section, we propose another scheme inspired from [12] . The idea is to transform the cubic system into a quadratic one and the to use the scheme given in [12] . As we will see, the number of computations is smaller, but the number of communication bits is more important. We investigate the transformation of a system with cubic equations to a system with quadratic equations. We will introduce new variables. Once we have obtained a system of equations with quadratic polynomials, we can apply the identification scheme of [12] . We will calculate the number of multiplications in this case. In our system, we have
and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). We introduce the new variables ∀i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, X ij = x i x j . The number of new variables is n(n−1) 2 , if q = 2, and
, if q = 2. In our new system, we haveF
where forx = (x 1 , . . . , x n , (X ij ) 1≤i≤j≤n ) and 1 ≤ ≤ m,
Here the number of variables isñ n + .C stands for the maximum number of computations that have to be done either by the prover or by the receiver. If R denotes the number of rounds performed in order to have an impersonation probability less than 2 −30 , thenR = 52 (cf. [12] ). The following table gives the characteristics of theZK(3) Scheme and the values we get when n = 84 and m = 80. 
We will design a 3-pass scheme We consider the following function of degree d from F n q to F m q :
where
and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). We omit the constant term. Let
The problem is: Given F and v ∈ F m q find s ∈ F n q such that F (s) = v The public key is (F, v). The secret is s such that F (s) = v.
The Prover picks up at random
Then she computes 
The verifier chooses a query Q ∈ R {0, 1, . . . , d} and sends Q to the prover. 
). The Verifier checks if
As for the the case d = 3, we have perfect correctness and the following results (see Appendix B for details):
Theorem 5 The 3-pass protocol ZK(d) is statistically zero knowledge when the commitment scheme Com is statistically hiding.
Theorem 6
The 3-pass protocol is proof of zero knowledge with zero knowledge error d d+1 when the commitment scheme Com is computationally binding. Remark. As for the case d = 3, it is possible to design a 5-pass scheme.
TheZK(d) Scheme
Here we explain how it is possible to design theZK(d) Scheme. Again there are two functions F andF . If M (resp.M ) denotes the number of computations for F (resp.F ), then Table 3 . Here we have an impersonation probability less than 2 −30 . Table 3 .
Number of (5dn + ln d 2
Relations for sparse systems
In the previous computations, we have supposed that we have the maximum number of coefficients. Then we obtained that in both cases, M M 
Relations between the number of computations and the number of coefficients
We begin with the ZK(d) scheme. We have:
The number of multiplications for f is given by
and for F the number M of multiplications is 
and then we have to multiply by the number of rounds R to get C.
The particular case of Brent equations
In this section, we introduce the Brent equations. Suppose we want to multiply two N × N matrices. The naive method will use N 2 multiplications. In fact for N = 2, Strassen's algorithm ( [16] ) requires 7 multiplications instead of 8 multiplications and Laderman showed that when N = 3 it is possible to use 23 multiplications instead of 3 3 = 27 ( [6] ). For N = 2, 7 is the least number we can obtain. For N = 3, it is not known if 23 is the least number in the non-commutative case. In [1] , it is shown that obtaining the product of two matrices N × N can be done using s multiplications is equivalent to solve the following system of cubic equations:
Here we have n = 3sN 2 , m = N 6 . If we use formula ( ), we obtain that the number of multiplications is 22 × s × N 6 if we use the ZK(3) scheme. It is also interesting to design an authentication public key cryptographic scheme as close as possible to Brent equations. In order to do this, we choose a system similar to Brent equations but for which we know a particular solution. It is possible to proceed as follows:
9 Morphisms of polynomials and systems of cubic equations
The MP Problem
The IP problem (Isomorphism of Polynomials) has been used to construct pubic key schemes (cf [9] ). On one hand, this is not a NP-complete problem since it admits an Arthur-Merlin game when the answer is yes and when the answer is no). On the other hand, the MP problem( morphisms of polynomials) where matrices are not supposed to be invertible is proved to be NP-complete ( [3, 10] ) and thus is much more difficult. So it is interesting to design a public key authentication scheme based on MP. We explain briefly below how it is possible to construct such a scheme by transforming MP very efficiently into a system of equations of degree 3 and then applying our ZK(3) orZK(3) protocols.
From MP to polynomials of degree 3
We consider the two following systems:
We want to find 2 matrices M = (m rs ) 1≤r≤v
For all t, 1 ≤ t ≤ v, on one hand, we have:
On the other hand, we have:
Thus we obtain vp 2 cubic equations and np + vu unknowns.
Conclusion
In [12] , a very efficient zero-knowledge proof based on the MQ problem (multivariate quadratic polynomials) is given. In this paper we proved that this construction can be generalized to polynomials of degree d for any d ≥ 3. We studied several constructions and we presented here the two most efficient ones denoted by
is quasi optimal in term of communication bits andZK(d) is quasi optimal in term of number of computations. This result is true for dense or sparse systems. We also presented two important specific problems (Brent equations and morphisms of polynomials) that can be transformed into efficient public key schemes using ZK(d) andZK(d).
(b) If Q = 1, then the prover sends (r 0 , r 2 ). The verifier checks if c 1 = Com(r 0 , r 2 , αr 0 − t 1 , αF (r 0 ) − e 1 , αF (r 0 + r 2 ) − h 1 ). (c) If Q = 2, then the prover sends (r 1 , r 2 ). The verifier checks if c 2 = Com(r 1 , r 2 , α(v −F (r 1 +r 2 )+F (r 1 )+F (r 2 ))−G(t 1 , r 1 , r 2 )−f 1 −h 1 +e 1 ).
As for the 3-pass scheme, we have perfect correctness and the following results(Proofs are sketched in Appendix A:
Theorem 7 The 5-pass protocol is statistically zero knowledge when the commitment scheme Com is statistically hiding.
Proof sketch. Let S be a simulator which takes F and v without knowing s, and interacts with a cheating verifier CV. We show that the simulator can impersonate the honest prover with probability 2/3. The simulator randomly chooses a value Ch * ∈ R {0, 1, 2} and vectors s , r 0 , r 1 , t 0 ∈ R F n q and e 0 , f 0 , h 0 ∈ R F m q , where Ch * is a prediction what value the cheating verifier CV will not choose. Then it computes r 2 ← s − (r 0 + r 1 )
and sends (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) to CV. Then receiving a challenge α from CV, it computes:
Then it sends (t 1 , e 1 f 1 , h 1 ) to CV Due to the statistically hiding property of Com, a challenge Ch from CV is different from Ch * with probability 2/3. If Ch = Ch * , then (r 0 , r 1 ), (r 0 , r 2 ), and (r 1 , r 2 ) are accepted responses to Ch = 0, 1 and 2 respectively.
Theorem 8
The 5-pass protocol is proof of zero knowledge with zero knowledge error 2/3+1/3q when the commitment scheme Com is computationnaly binding.
(i,j) ) be six transcripts for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that Dec (F, v, ((c 1 , c 1 , c 2 
(i,j) p) = 1, α 0 = α 1 , and Ch j = j. Then, by using the six transcripts, we show that we are able either to break the binding property of Com or extract a solution for v. Consider the situation where the responses are parsed as
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Thus we obtain v = F (r
2 ). This means that a solutionr
for v is extracted.
B Proofs for the ZK(d) Scheme
Theorem 9 The 3-pass protocol is statistically zero knowledge when the commitment scheme Com is statistically hiding.
Proof sketch. Let S be a simulator which takes F and v without knowing s, and interacts with a cheating verifier CV. We show that the simulator can impersonate the honest prover with probability
The simulator randomly chooses a value Ch * ∈ R {0, 1, . . . , d} and vectors s , r 0 , r 1 , . . . ,
where Ch * is a prediction what value the cheating verifier CV will not choose. Then it computes
Moreover it sets: 
and sends c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 2d−2 to tCV. Due to the statistically hiding property of Com, a challenge Ch from CV is different from Ch * with probability Finally, we obtain v = F (r 
